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evidence touchstone without elaboration,"' but others have recognized
that the precise issue is whether the "evidence required to support a
conviction on one indictment would have been sufficient to warrant a
conviction on the other.""2 This approach recognizes the merit of the
"same evidence" rule while adding the larger scope of the "necessarily
adjudicated" test.
The contribution of the Nash decision as an aid to understanding what
may be foreclosed from perjury prosecutions will have its greatest impact
on the state courts which will be looking for guidance in applying the
Supreme Court criteria now applicable to them. 3 The unfortunate as-
pect of the case is its rote dependability on the "necessarily adjudicated"
formula.64 This broad and uncertain approach creates difficulties in pre-
dicting the outcome of future perjury cases. A greater emphasis on the
substantial identity of the evidence, however, would clearly state under
what conditions a perjury trial would be proper. Furthermore, this latter
approach acknowledges the soundness of the policy for not allowing per-
jurers to remain unpunished if new evidence has been produced. Instead
of promulgating a new set of workable standards adopted from combin-
ing and distinguishing previous criteria, the Nash decision blindly accepts
and refuses to clarify a semantic test- which has, by itself, only dubious
merit.
THOMAS ALEXANDER GosSE
OUT-OF-STATE WITNESSES AND COMPULSORY
PROCESS: THE INDIGENT DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS
The right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in a
criminal prosecution is guaranteed to a defendant by the sixth amend-
ment.' Yet at one time a defendant had no means by which to enforce
this right in a state criminal proceeding where a material witness was
"See Wheatley v. United States, 286 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1961); Kuskulis v. United
States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1929); Youngblood v. United States, 266 F. 795 (8th Cir.
1920); Chitwood v. United States, 178 F. 442 (8th Cir. 1910). See also Ehrlich v. United
States, 145 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1944).
"2 United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 1971); see United States v.
Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Butler, 38 F. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1889).
63Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
"447 F.2d at 1387 (Winter, J., concurring).
'In part, the sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to. . .have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor ..
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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absent from the jurisdiction of the trial court.2 Today an absent material
witness can be obtained in those jurisdictions which have adopted the
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings (hereinafter the Uniform Act).3 While the
Uniform Act provides a means by which the attendance of the out-of-
state witness can be secured,' the party seeking to produce the witness
2Minder v. Georgia, 183 U.S. 559 (1902).
3ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.50.010 et seq. (1962): ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§. 13-1861 etseq.
(1956): ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2005 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1964): CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1334
et seq. (West 1970): COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-6-1 et seq. (1963): CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. 54-22 et seq. (1958): DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3521 et seq. (1953): FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 942.01 et seq. (1944): IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3005 (1947); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 156-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972): IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-1626 et seq. (Repl.
Vol. 1956); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4201 et seq. (Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 421.230 et seq. (1969): LA. CODE CRIM. L. & PROC. ANN. art. 741 etseq. (West
1967): ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1411 et seq. (1964): MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, §§ 617 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1971): MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, §.§ 13A et seq. (1956):
MINN. STAT. ANN. 634.06 et seq. (Supp. 1971): MIss. CODE ANN..§ 1892 et seq.
(1956): Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.400 et seq. (Supp. 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN..§ 94-
9001 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1969): NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1906 et seq. (1964): NEV. REV.
STAT. §. 174.395 et seq. (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.1 et seq. (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:81-18 et seq. (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-12-13 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1964);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 640:10 (McKinney 1971): N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-65 et seq.
(Repl. Vol. 1969): N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-03-25 et seq. (1960): OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2939.25 et seq. (Baldwin 1971): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 721 et seq. (1969):
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 139.210 etseq. (1969): PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 622.1 etseq. (1964):
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 12-16-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE ANN. 26-301 et seq.
(1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 23-40-14 (1967): TENN. CODE ANN. §.§ 40-2429 etseq. (1955):
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 24.28 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-45-11 et seq.
(1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6641 et seq. (1958); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-269 et seq.
(Repl. Vol. 1960); WASH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 10.55.010 etseq. (1956); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 62-6A-1 et seq. (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.33 (1958): Wyo. STAT. ANN. §.§ 7-250
et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1952); D.C.CODE ANN. §§ 23-801 et seq. (Supp. V. 1971). Alabama,
Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa and Michigan have not adopted the Uniform Act. The constitution-
ality of the Uniform Act has been upheld in New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
'To obtain a witness under the Uniform Act both the state seeking to obtain the witness
and the state in which the witness is located must have adopted the Act. An application is
made to the judge of the court in which the prosecution is pending. If the judge finds that
the requested witness is material, he may issue a certificate bearing the seal of the court,
stating the facts, and specifying the number of days for which the witness will be required.
This certificate is then presented to a judge of a court of record in the county in which the
witness is found. That judge then summons the witness to appear and holds a hearing to
determine if the witness is material and necessary. If he so finds, he issues an order directing
the witness to attend and testify in the court where the prosecution is pending. The witness,
then, must attend after being tendered the specified statutory fee or else be subject to
punishment as if he had failed to comply with a summons to appear before a court of record
in his own state. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-65 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1969).
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must first tender him a specified fee.' Therefore, when an indigent defen-
dant seeks to obtain a witness under the Uniform Act, the indigent cannot
obtain compulsory process unless the state pays the required witness fee.
The recent case of Preston v. Blackledge examines the question of
whether an indigent defendant is denied his rights to compulsory process
and to equal protection when a judge refuses to issue process under the
Uniform Act at public expense.
Preston was a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which petitioners,
who had been convicted in the courts of North Carolina of armed rob-
bery, alleged that the state had denied them their sixth amendment right
to compulsory process, as applied to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 7 and their fourteenth amendment
right to equal protection when it failed to secure the attendance of peti-
tioners' alibi witnesses from Pennsylvania at public expense.' Although
process had been issued and the witnesses obtained under the Uniform
Act at public expense at four previous trials, each of which ended in a
mistrial with a hung jury,' the trial judge refused to issue process at public
expense at the fifth trial."0 Consequently, the witnesses were not present
at the fifth trial and the petitioners were convicted."
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the order of the trial
judge, 2 stating that appellants had cited no authority by which the trial
5The Uniform Act provides that witnesses shall be paid ten cents a mile for each mile
by the ordinary route to and from the court where the prosecution is pending and five dollars
for each day that he is required to travel and attend as a witness. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-66 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
6332 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
'Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
8332 F. Supp. at 682.
91d. Also at issue in Preston was whether the fifth trial violated the petitioners' constitu-
tional protection against double jeopardy. The district court held that this right had been
violated and in addition to granting the writ, prohibited the state from holding a new trial.
Id. at 685-86.
11Id. at 683. See also State v. Preston, 9 N.C. App. 71, 175 S.E.2d 705, 708-09 (1970).
The Uniform Act was adopted in North Carolina in 1937. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-65
et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1969).
"332 F. Supp. at 682.
12State v. Preston, 9 N.C. App. 71, 175 S.E.2d 705, 709 (1970).
[tlhe presiding superior court judge entered an order finding as a fact that
the testimony of these witnesses (who were a sister and brother-in-law of
defendant Mitchell) as given by them under oath at a previous trial was
available to defendants, that there was no provision of law under which
Wake County or the State of North Carolina could be required to pay the
expenses of the witnesses as requested, and that the interests of the defen-
dants could be protected by the use of the testimony of these witnesses as
theretofore given by them under oath and recorded by the court reporter
at a previous trial of this case.
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judge could compel the state or county to appropriate funds for the
witness fees required by the Uniform Act. 3 While it was recognized that
appellants' right to due process might require that the state pay the fee
in some cases, the court felt that due process was adequately afforded to
appellants by the admission into evidence of the sworn testimony of the
alibi witnesses which was taken at the previous trial. 4
The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus, 5 holding that it
was error not to issue process at public expense under the Uniform Act. 6
Since all considerations properly within the discretion of the trial judge
had been resolved in favor of the defendants at four previous trials, 7
failure to secure the witnesses solely because the state would have to pay
their expenses violated the defendants' right to equal protection of the
law.'" Furthermore, in the absence of circumstances which necessitated
the substitution of recorded testimony for the actual presence of the
witnesses, 19 the failure of the trial judge to take steps necessary to secure
the witnesses violated the defendants' sixth amendment right to compul-
sory process.20 The district court concluded that the trial judge abused his
discretion under the Uniform Act when the effect of his action was to
violate the defendants' constitutional rights.'
The sixth amendment right to compulsory process was applied to the
states in Washington v. Texas,22 where the Supreme Court stated that this
"Id. At the time of the Preston trial, North Carolina statute provided that a witness
in a criminal action would be paid from state funds and the amount disbursed would be
assessed in the bill of costs. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-316 (Repl. Vol. 1969). The state is liable
for this bill of costs unless the defendant is found guilty, in which case he is liable. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 6-45, -49 (Repl. Vol. 1969) (§ 6-45 repealed 1971). However, the Uniform
Act requires that the witness be tendered the fee in advance. N.C. GEN. STAT. §. 8-66, -67
(Repl. Vol. 1969). North Carolina statute prohibits the payment of witness fees by the state
in advance of the attendance of the witness. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-51 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
119 N.C. App. 71, 175 S.E.2d 705, 709 (1970).
"5Petitioners had exhausted their state remedies since they had appealed the decision
of the North Carolina Court of Appeals by seeking a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court




"The death of a witness, inability to locate him, or his presence in a jurisdiction which
has not adopted the Uniform Act may necessitate the substitution of recorded testimony.
See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 1403-08 (3d ed. 1940).
20332 F. Supp. at 684.
211d.
22388 U.S. 14 (1967). At issue in Washington were two Texas statutes which prevented
a participant accused of a crime from testifying for, but not against, his coparticipant. The
Court held that the sixth amendment right to compulsory process applies to the states
through incorporation by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that these
state statutes violated this sixth amendment right.
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right "is so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' Without
this right the accused is seriously impaired in his efforts to present a
defense. The Court concluded that compulsory process and the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses are complementary rights which
allow the defendant to present his version of the facts. 4 The ability of a
court to compel the attendance of a witness, however, is generally thought
to be limited by the territorial jurisdiction of the court.2
This traditional view of compulsory process is illustrated by the case
of Minder v. Georgia.2 6 In Minder, which predated the Uniform Act,21 a
defendant in a state criminal proceeding asserted that the state had failed
to afford him process by which to compel the attendance of witnesses who
resided in another state.2 This, he contended, violated his right to due
process under the fourteenth amendment since these witnesses were essen-
tial to his defense." The Supreme Court held that when a state was unable
to procure a witness for a criminal prosecution because the witness was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the defendant was not deprived of
due process where the state had no means by which to compel the atten-
dance." An initial question in Preston, then, was whether or not the state
had a means by which to compel the attendance of the out-of-state wit-
nesses.
Prior to Preston the predominant view among the states was that the
Uniform Act was not a means for providing compulsory process3' be-
cause
[t]he Uniform Act does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts
2Id. at 17-18.
24Id. at 19. The Court stated that
[j]ust as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses
for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present
his own witnesses to establish a defense.
Id.
25See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971). The fact that
an American court lacks power to subpoena witnesses, other than American citizens, from
foreign countries does not make a conviction unconstitutional as violating the sixth amend-
ment right to compulsory process. United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962).
28183 U.S. 559 (1902).
2The Uniform Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws in September, 1931. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 87 (1957).
28183 U.S. 559, 559-60 (1902).
2Id. at 560.
=Id. at 561-62.
31E.g., People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal. 2d 262, 444 P.2d 110, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1968);
Vore v. State, 158 Neb. 222, 63 N.W.2d 141 (1954); State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d
419 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 962 (1954).
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of this state beyond its territorial limits, for this is not within the
power of the legislature. The operation of the Uniform Act de-
pends upon the principles of comity, and it has no efficacy except
through the adoption of the same act by another state."
State courts seemed to place more emphasis on being able to compel the
attendance of an out-of-state witness than on securing the presence of the
witness for the trial. The rationale of Minder was used as a justification
for this position,33 and the fact that the Uniform Act provided a means
by which to secure out-of-state witnesses was not deemed sufficient to
make it a means to guarantee compulsory process.
The theory that it is impossible to compel the attendance of an out-
of-state witness "because the process of the trial court is of no force
without the jurisdiction" was rejected by the Supreme Court in Barber
v. Page,34 which stated that this theory was no longer valid where the
Uniform Act had been adopted by both the jurisdiction of the prosecution
and the jurisdiction in which the witness was located.3 The Court recog-
nized that the Uniform Act provides a means by which out-of-state wit-
nesses can be obtained to teitif.y at a state criminal proceeding.36 While
Barber dealt with the ability of a court to compel the attendance of an
out-of-state prosecution witness in order to protect the defendant's sixth
amendment right to confrontation of witnesses, the reasoning would seem
equally applicable to the defendant's right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.37 The Court held that to protect the right
to confrontation, a good faith effort was required to obtain the absent
witness through whatever means were available.3 Since Washington
equated the right to confrontation of witnesses with the right to compul-
sory process, 39 it may be concluded that the Uniform Act is a means by
which to guarantee a defendant his right to compulsory process.4"
However, the issuance of process under the Uniform Act is not auto-
matic. The trial judge in the jurisdiction of the pending prosecution is
32State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419, 426 (1953).
3Text accompanying note 30 supra.
-390 U.S. 719, 723 (1968).
33d.
3 1d. at 723-24.
3Note 24 and accompanying text supra.
-390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
31388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
'"In those jurisdictions which have not adopted the Uniform Act, Minder would still
seem to control. Following the Minder rationale, the inability of a court to obtain an out-
of-state witness because either the state of the prosecution or the state in which the witness
is located had not adopted the Uniform Act would not violate a defendant's right to
compulsory process. Cf. United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971).
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vested with discretion under the Uniform Act4 to decide whether or not
process should be issued to obtain an out-of-state witness. The Uniform
Act provides that
[i]f a person. . . is a material witness in a prosecution pending in
a court of record of this State, . . .a judge of such court may
issue a certificate under the seal of the court .... 12
The judge must first decide, then, that the requested witness is material.
The burden of establishing materiality is on the party seeking to obtain
the witness."
Once a finding of materiality is made, the issuance of process under
the Uniform Act is still subject to the discretion of the judge, inasmuch
as the Act provides that a judge "may" issue process to obtain a material
witness." Cases interpreting the discretion allowed the judge under the
Act have held that he may scrutinize the good faith of the party request-
ing the presence of -the out-of-state witness." If the judge feels that the
request is made only for purposes of delay," or if he deems the testimony
of the requested witness to be cumulative and of little.value, process may
be denied at his discretion.
The district court in Preston apparently felt that since petitioners
sought to obtain alibi witnesses who were presumably instrumental in
producing four hung juries, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge
to refuse to issue process at the fifth trial. At the four previous trials all
of the issues within the discretion of the judge had been resolved in favor
of defendants and process was issued. Thus, based upon the premise that
4The judge in the foreign jurisdiction in which the witness is located is also vested with
the discretion to ascertain that the witness will not be caused any undue hardship and that
the laws of the state in which the prosecution is pending and of any states through which
the witness must pass will provide protection to him from arrest and service of civil and
criminal process. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-66 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
42N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-67 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
'3E.g., State v. Mance, 7 Ariz. App. 269, 438 P.2d 338 (1968); State v. Smith, 87 N.J.
Super. 98, 208 A.2d 171 (1965); State v. Etheridge, 74 Wash. 2d 102, 443 P.2d 536 (1968).
"'Note 42 and accompanying text supra.
"See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dirring, 354 Mass. 523, 238 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1968);
State v. Smith, 87 N.J. Super. 98, 208 A.2d 171, 175 (1965); State v. Smith, 458 P.2d 687,
690 (Ore. App. 1969).
48d.
"People v. Cavanaugh, 69 Cal. 2d 262,444 P.2d 110, 114-16, 70 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1968).
A trial judge may generally stop further introduction of cumulative testimony when the
point in dispute has been thoroughly presented and further testimony will be of no assistance
in arriving at a conclusion as to the truth of the issue. See Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handels-
man, 307 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1962); Henson & Sons Coal Co. v. Strickland, 152 Ark. 203,
238 S.W. 5 (1922).
"332 F. Supp. at 683.
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the Uniform Act was a means t6 protect the sixth amendment right to
compulsory process," the district court concluded that the refusal to issue
process at the fifth trial violated this right." It would also seem, based
upon Supreme Court decisions regarding the rights of indigents,5' that the
issue of whether or not the witnesses could be obtained at public expense
was not within the discretion of the trial judge.
In Griffin v. Illinois"2 the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]here can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends upon the
amount of money he has."5 The Court held that by failing to provide a
free trial transcript to indigent defendants in a felony case, the state had
effectively denied them an adequate appellate review of alleged non-
constitutional errors committed at their trial." This action constituted
invidious discrimination which violated the defendants' right to equal
protection of the law, as only indigent defendants were barred from the
appellate process.5 5 In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court has ex-
panded the application of the Griffin rationale to include, for example,
the right to free transcripts in non-felony cases in order to effect appellate
review56 and the right to counsel for appellate proceedings."
The decision of the district court in Preston is fully supported by the
principles enunciated in Griffin. As the Preston court noted, "the fact that
petitioners were indigent should create no bar to securing the attendance
of these witnesses under the Uniform Act."5 " Since the witnesses had
previously been obtained four times at public expense under the Uniform
Act, the court seemed unpersuaded by the excuse that the trial judge was
neither required nor authorized by state statute to obtain the witnesses
49Text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
5332 F. Supp. at 684.
"E.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (denial of equal protection to limit punish-
ment to payment of a fine for those who are able to pay it but to convert the fine to
imprisonment for those who are unable to pay it); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)
(violation of equal protection to add to prison sentence of indigent for inability to pay fine);
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (affirming indigent's right to counsel on appeal);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (providing counsel for indigent's appeal); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guaranteeing indigent the right to counsel at trial);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (requiring free trial transcript for indigents if neces-
sary for appellate review).
52351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11Id. at 19.
'lid. at 18-19. The State of Illinois did provide a free transcript to indigents for
appellate review of constitutional questions. Id. at 15.
"Id. at 18.
"E.g., Mayer.v. Chicago, 92 S. Ct. 410 (1971) (non-felony case; only a fine, as opposed
to imprisonment, involved).
57E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
m332 F. Supp. at 685.
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at public expense. 9 It seems clear that but for the defendants' indigency,
the trial judge would have issued process and the out-of-state witnesses
would have been obtained for the fifth trial. This type of judicial expe-
diency, then, seems to be the kind of invidious economic discrimination
which is prohibited by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."
In Griffin the Court also recognized that by denying convicted indi-
gents access to appellate review the state had denied them fourteenth
amendment due process. 1 However, the state was not required to furnish
a free transcript in every case but was given the latitude to provide alter-
native means by which to perfect appellate review." That alternatives
may be adequate to protect the indigent's right to due process is suggested
in the recent case of Britt v. North Carolina,63 where an indigent defen-
dant requested a free transcript of his first trial, which ended with a hung
jury, for purposes of preparing for his second trial." The Court held that
where the trial court reporter would have read back notes of the first trial
to defendant's counsel at his request, the defendant had available an
informal alternative substantially equivalent to a transcript, 5 and that the
Griffin mandate thus had not been violated.66
The latitude which Griffin allows would seem to raise a question in
the Preston case as to whether or not the trial court had provided an
acceptable alternative at the fifth trial by reading the sworn testimony of
the witnesses from a previous trial. 7 The district court effectively an-
swered this question:
While the recorded testimony of the previous trials gave the jury
an adequate version of the substance of their [the witnesses'] testi-
mony, it could in no way give the jury any idea of the witnesses'
demeanor or credibility by which they could weigh the substantive
nature of the testimony. The presence of these witnesses under the
circumstances of this case was vital to petitioners' right to receive
a fair trial.6"
The fact that petitioners were convicted only at their fifth trial when their
alibi witnesses were not present raises a serious doubt as to the adequacy
'lid. at 683-85.
'lid. at 684-85.
61351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
6ld. at 20.




p332 F. Supp. at 683.
Uid. at 684.
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of the alternative provided by the trial court. The reason given by the
district court for rejecting the substitute of recorded testimony, namely
that the jury was deprived of the opportunity to observe the witnesses'
demeanor and then weigh their substantive testimony," essentially sup-
ports the rationale behind the right to compulsory process. 0
Although consistent with the rationale of Supreme Court cases such
as Griffin and Barber, Preston runs contrary to the weight of state case
law on both the issue of the right to compulsory process under the Uni-
form Act and the issue of the indigent's right to witness fees under the
Act." The Oregon case of State v. Blount" is illustrative of the position
taken by state courts prior to Preston.
In Blount an indigent defendant sought to obtain two witnesses from
California through the provisions of the Uniform Act. The trial judge
issued the requisite certificates but then denied a motion to obtain the
witnesses at the public expense.7" The indigent defendant contended that
he had been denied his constitutional rights to compulsory process and
to equal protection.74 The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the Uni-
form Act did not provide a means for guaranteeing compulsory process75
and that the indigent defendant could not be heard to complain of a denial
of equal protection since the prosecution had not invoked the Uniform
Act at public expense.76 It is questionable, however, in light of Griffin and
Barber, whether Blount and the other cases reaching a similar conclusion
are still good law.
Assuming that Preston has been properly decided, it establishes pre-
cedent in two important areas of criminal justice administration. The case
has expanded the right to compulsory process to include the obtaining of
out-of-state witnesses in those jurisdictions which have adopted the Uni-
691d.
10Cf. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
"See, e.g., State ex rel. Butler v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 24, 66 N.W.2d 1 (1954); Vore
v. State, 158 Neb. 222, 63 N.W.2d 141 (1954); State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 221 P.2d
404 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 932 (1951); State v. Blount, 200 Ore. 35, 264 P.2d 419
(1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 962 (1954); State v. Hemmenway, 80 S.D. 153, 120 N.W.2d
561 (1963).




761d. at 427. On the issue of equal protection the Oregon court stated that
the defendant has not in fact been the victim of any discrimination ...
because the state has brought no witnesses from California, and has re-
ceived no advantage from the Uniform Nct denied to the defendant.
Id. Whether or not there was discrimination between rich and poor defendants was not
considered, but it must be noted that this case was decided prior to Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). See text accompanying notes 52-70 supra.
